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This research examines the effects of various factors on farmer participation in agricultural tree 
plantations for economic, environmental, social and carbon-uptake purposes, and potential costs 
of sequestering carbon through afforestation in western Canada. Using data from a survey of 
landowners, a discrete choice random utility model is used to determine the probability of 
landowners’ participation and corresponding mean willingness to accept (WTA) compensation 
for a tree-planting program. WTA includes positive and negative benefits to landowners from 
planting trees, benefits not captured by foregone returns from agricultural activities on marginal 
land. Estimates of WTA are less than foregone returns, but even so average costs of creating 
carbon credits still exceed their projected value under a CO2-emissions trading scheme. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As a result of the U.S.’s withdrawal from the Kyoto process, the EU relented to a much 
broader definition of and role for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities in 
lieu of greenhouse gas emissions in meeting targets during Kyoto’s first commitment period 
(2008-12). At COP7 in November 2001 at Marrakech, the annual cap on carbon (C) uptake in 
sinks for 2008-12 was set at 219 Mt C (151 Mt C if the U.S. is left out). Thus, terrestrial sinks 
could conceivably account for more than 80% of the 250 Mt C annual reduction from 1990 
levels required of Annex B countries, although the proportion is much lower when compared to 
projected business-as-usual emission levels. It is not clear, however, whether carbon sink offsets 
are economically competitive with emissions reduction (van Kooten et al. 2004). Efficient land-
use management in agriculture and forestry requires evaluation in terms of the cost-effectiveness 
of carbon uptake.  
One option for achieving significant carbon offsets is to plant trees on marginal 
agricultural land. In addition to providing carbon-uptake and potential commercial timber 
benefits, tree planting provides non-market benefits from reduced soil erosion, improved water 
quality, increased wildlife habitat, riparian buffer zones and aesthetic appeal. In 2002, the U.S. 
Farm Bill extended the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) with a hardwood tree initiative 
that would restore up to 500,000 acres of floodplains by planting bottomland hardwood trees on 
private lands.
1 The initiative preserves the CRP’s initial goals of reducing soil erosion and 
                                                 
1 The Conservation Reserve Program was established in 1985 and has been an ongoing project to 
reduce soil erosion and improve land quality through voluntary participation of land idling. 
  2improving wildlife habitat, while extending the program to the potential sequestration of 100 
million metric tons of greenhouse gases (USDA 2003). As the CRP indicates, society might 
subsidize afforestation regardless of concerns about climate change, because of soil 
conservation, wildlife and other externality benefits. However, the concern here is with carbon 
uptake.  
Since forgone returns from agricultural activities are an unreliable measure of the 
willingness of landowners to plant trees (e.g., see Stavins 1999), the purpose of the current study 
is to examine the compensation landowners in western Canada might require for converting 
pasture and cropland to forestry.
2 Determining compensation is not straightforward because: (1) 
there is uncertainty about the costs of tree planting, actual yields and stumpage values due to 
geographical differences in proximity to saw mills or pulp mills; (2) some returns to tree planting 
accrue in the distant future, causing disruptions in income flows that could increase 
compensation demanded; (3) farmers may feel that their ability to participate in current and 
future government agricultural programs is threatened by tree planting because capacity to 
produce agricultural commodities is reduced; and (4) landowners have varying preferences 
towards managed forests versus agricultural ecosystems.
3 Non-market values and risk attitudes 
play a significant role in farming decisions, so compensation set equal to agricultural rents 
(including any price support or subsidy payments) may not be appropriate for convincing 
landowners to change their land use to forestry.  
                                                 
2 I t is important to recognize that current tree planting is unlikely to have much effect in terms of 
attaining Kyoto targets for 2008-12. Incremental growth at that time will be too small, although 
the result of ongoing negotiations regarding monitoring may enable suppliers of carbon sink 
credits to use expected average annual growth over the entire rotation rather than current MAI. 
Current tree planting may, however, be used in subsequent commitment periods. 
3 Stavins (1999) provides a slightly different list of reasons, which include concerns about 
irreversibility and liquidity constraints. 
  3The compensation required will be higher if landowners realize non-market benefits from 
agriculture and/or worry about the lack of guaranteed payments between the end of a contract 
period and the time trees are harvested. They could also be lower if annual forestry payments 
reduce landowners’ risks (even if such payments stop some years before trees mature) and/or 
forestry provides non-market (e.g., aesthetic) benefits. Information from a contingent valuation 
survey is valuable in this context, because it is able to incorporate non-market values and risk 
attitudes, as well as unobservable transactions costs, into the compensation amount. Rather than 
rely on returns to agricultural activities, which are an unreliable guide to the willingness of 
landowners to convert farmland to forestry, we employ data from a survey of western Canadian 
farmers to provide estimates of the possible costs of creating carbon offsets on marginal 
agricultural land. The survey explicitly asked landowners about their willingness to accept 
(WTA) compensation for participation in tree-planting programs. The purpose is to compare the 
costs of carbon uptake when compensation demanded is used instead of the opportunity cost of 
land to determine if tree planting is a cost-effective means of achieving Kyoto-type targets. 
The paper is organized as follows. A general overview of the theory in the context of tree 
planting is presented in the next section, followed by a discussion of the data and an explanation 
of the empirical model. Using estimates of compensation levels and opportunity costs of land, 
the cost-effectiveness of potential tree planting programs is examined. The paper concludes with 




  42. MODEL FOR ANALYZING DECISIONS TO CONVERT FARMLAND TO     
FORESTRY 
In this study, a discrete-choice random utility maximization (RUM) framework is used to 
model the decision of a landowner to convert farmland to forestry. The landowner will accept a 
bid to afforest (marginal) agricultural land so as long as the compensation offered is at least as 
much as the opportunity cost of not producing plus any positive or negative non-market/risk 
benefits that he/she gets from planting trees. This decision can be modeled as follows: 
Landowner i will accept a tree-planting project (a = 1) as long as vi,1(m+∆m, s) + εi,1 > vi,0(m, s) + 
εi,0, where ∆m is the compensation or bid (B) offered minus forgone expected annual net returns 
in agriculture (OC). Since utility is a random variable, the probability that a farmer's choice to 
accept the bid can be written (suppressing subscript i) as (Hanemann 1984; Greene 2000):  
(1) Pr(a=1) = Pr{v1(m+∆m, s)+ε1 > v0(m, s)+ε0} = Pr{(ε1 – ε0) > –[v1(m+∆m, s) – v0(m, s)]}.  
Replacing [v1(m+∆m, s) – v0(m, s)]/σ with ∆v and (ε1 – ε0)/σ with ε, where ε~N(0,1) is i.i.d. 
because ε1 and ε0 are i.i.d., yields the probit model: 
(2) Pr(a=1) = Pr(ε > –∆v) = Fε (∆v), 
where Fε is the normal cumulative distribution function (cdf).  
Timber benefits accrue in the distant future and their realization depends on what 
landowners do after the expiration of the contingency contract, with contracts usually of ten 
years duration. For example, landowners might sell the land and realize the value of the standing 
timber plus carbon benefits, or they might choose to hold the land until harvest perhaps renting 
or leasing the carbon offset credits to a third party (e.g., large industrial emitter) in the meantime. 
The costs of possibly converting land back to agriculture at the time of harvest will at least 
partially offset the timber returns. These costs consist of stump removal and root raking plus the 
  5foregone returns of lost agricultural (or forestry and carbon) production for period of one to two 
years. Timber returns also occur relatively far in the future, thus creating a considerable risk 
premium further offsetting any timber benefits. The alternative to converting the land back to 
agriculture is keeping it in forestry, which requires a farmer’s long-term commitment to growing 
trees and learning about forestry practices and timber marketing (see Plantinga 1997 for further 
discussion). As a result, we do not include timber benefits in the ∆m measure. Rather, we expect 
landowners take into account such benefits in formulating their responses to a question eliciting a 
willingness to accept compensation for a tree-planting program. Positive expected forest rents 
are one factor that will lower WTA.  
The decision to accept the proposed compensation is based on the returns from the least 
productive parcel of land, with the least productive acres assumed to be the ones a landowner 
would commit to a tree planting program. Thus, the landowner will compare v1(m+B–OC, s) 
against v 0(m, s), where B is the bid and OC is the opportunity cost of foregone agricultural 
production on a per acre basis and ∆m = B – OC. While the opportunity cost represents foregone 
agricultural net returns from accepting a tree planting program, the total compensation required 
by the farmer may be increased by other non-market values associated with keeping the land in 
agriculture (e.g., the landowner may prefer an agricultural landscape or feels a commitment to an 
earlier generation that cleared the land) and/or reduced by non-market (say, aesthetic) values 
associated with forestry. Compensation demanded is also affected by landowners’ perceptions 
about the reduced risk of fixed annual payments (at least over the contract period), increased 
risks associated with forest and carbon markets (assuming these develop) after the initial contract 
period, and so on.  
Following Hanemann’s (1984) linear-in-parameters utility specification, so that welfare 
  6calculations are derived in a manner compatible with utility maximization, we re-write (2) as:  













where E[aX] is the conditional mean probability, X is a vector of exogenous variables, Fε is the 
standard normal cdf and φ is the corresponding probability density function. The log-likelihood 
function is given generally by: 
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where h( ⋅ ) represents a standard normal distribution function.  
Landowners’ minimum WTA compensation, denoted by B
*, is determined as the amount 
of money needed to keep the farmer indifferent between accepting the bid and retaining marginal 
land in agriculture. One can express this indifference by setting the probability of accepting a bid 
in (1) equal to 0.5 and solving for B
* – the median willingness to accept compensation.  
3. SURVEY OF CANADIAN FARMERS 
A questionnaire was mailed in July 2000 to 2,000 randomly selected Canadian farmers 
from the grain belt region of northeastern British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba. Farmers with less than 160 acres of land were omitted from the survey sample since 
small landowners were unlikely to contribute significant amounts of land. Dairy farmers were 
also excluded from the sample for their presumed high opportunity cost of tree planting due to 
value-added production. A total of 379 surveys were returned undelivered, due to the lack of 
available updates of the mailing list purchased from Watts Brokerage Listing. Reminder cards 
were sent out three weeks after the first mailing. The effective response rate (corrected for 
  7returned/undelivered surveys) was 13%, higher than the 12% rates reported by the Environics 
Research Group (2000) in their study of stewardship of Canadian farmers and by Bell et  al 
(1994).
4   
The survey included a brief, personalized cover letter explaining the purpose of the 
questionnaire and a definition of carbon offset credits. In addition to willingness to accept 
compensation for tree planting, the actual survey also elicited detailed information on a farmer’s 
agricultural operations including activities on marginal fields, farmers’ opinions about and 
awareness of climate change issues and carbon credits, and personal characteristics and 
demographics (Suchánek 2001). Personal and demographic information can be compared with 
similar data from Canada’s 2001 Census of Agriculture. 
Direct comparisons between Census and survey data are difficult because the survey used 
a much finer grid for age and net worth data than reported in the Census of Agriculture. The 
survey employed ten age and net worth categories, while the Census reports three age and five 
net worth categories. Education is reported in the Census as the proportion of individuals with 
education levels according to the following four categories: “less than grade 9”, “grade 9 to 13” 
(Ontario used grade 13), “post-secondary, non-university”, and “university”. The survey asked 
respondents to indicate the number of years of post-secondary education, with categories ranging 
from 0 to 7+ years. The average age of respondents in the survey is 56.5 years, while it is 52 
years in the Census; the average net worth of survey respondents is $587,000, whereas the 
                                                 
4 This low response rate is not at all atypical of farm surveys as the Environics survey of 
Canadian farmers and Bell et al. survey of Tennessee farmers indicate. Importantly, response 
rates for executives of small firms are notoriously low (see Friedman and Singh 1989), and farms 
must be viewed as small firms, and not as individuals commonly surveyed using CVM. But 
response rates for individuals may even be low depending on the topic. Riddel and Shaw (2003), 
for example, report a response rate of 24% for those who previously agreed to participate in a 
telephone survey about nuclear waste, implying an effective response rate perhaps half that.  
  8Census average for the Prairie Provinces (excluding BC) is $628,000. Survey respondents 
completed an average 1.44 years of post-secondary education, while the comparable average 
education level of prairie farmers in the 2001 Census was about one year of post-secondary 
education (assuming that “post-secondary, non-university” equals 2 years and “university” 
equals 4 years). The differences between survey and Census net worth, age and education are 
small and can easily be attributed to the differences in the reporting categories employed.  
The first series of questions in the survey was meant to reduce information biases by 
familiarizing respondents with the topic and issues under investigation before asking them about 
their willingness to plant trees. Landowners were presented a hypothetical tree-planting program 
that covers all costs of tree planting while compensating for lost agricultural production. A 
compensation amount was offered to convert their least productive land to forest under a 10-year 
contract. The hypothetical program offered landowners was considered as attractive as the 
hardwood tree initiative of the CRP. Initial payment amounts for early CRP programs were 
determined through test programs and auctions with landowners. The bid compensation amounts 
for this study were selected on the basis of results from a pilot study, and range from $1 to $60 
per acre per year (see Suchánek 2001).
5 The distribution of these bids is skewed towards the 
lower bound of the range in order to provide more efficient estimates of WTA (Cooper 1993). 
The contingent contract indicates that farmers have no right to harvest the trees before the 
contract expires, but trees become their property at the end of the contract period. The contract 
provides no compensation for the conversion of land back to agriculture.  
  94. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
The explanatory variables of greatest interest are the level of the bid and the opportunity 
cost of the (least productive) field that would be planted to trees if the bid is accepted. Together 
these form the actual compensation that a landowner might expect. The calculation of 
opportunity cost deserves further attention. Farmers were asked to provide information for up to 
four of their least productive fields. Land uses were combined into three categories: pasture, hay 
and grain, with the latter including wheat, canola, barley, rye, oats, flax, lentils, peas and summer 
fallow. Net returns to each land use vary according to soil zone and region. Survey data on costs 
of production and returns by region and agricultural activity are available for Alberta. We 
constructed weighted averages of net returns for agricultural activities on marginal farmland 
(weighted by number of farmers providing information to extension agents) for five regions in 
Alberta (Table 1) and apply these to the landowners in our survey. Notice that cropping may not 
always be the most profitable activity on marginal land, but farmers will nonetheless crop the 
land because, under Canada’s grain marketing system, they receive quota for cropland but not for 
land in perennial hay or pasture. We assign an opportunity cost for tree planting on the basis of 
the region in which a respondent is located and the land use on their marginal field.
6  
Landowners could very well obtain positive non-market plus “intangible” benefits from 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Agricultural producers identified their least productive fields and the use of those fields in an 
earlier section of the survey. They were then told of the role of tree planting in mitigating climate 
change and the terms of a potential contract. Finally, the farmer is asked to respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
to the following question: “Suppose a block tree-planting program is available, and at least one 
of your fields is identified as a potential site for tree plantations. Would you be willing to accept 
annual compensation of $___ per acre for a 10-year contract?” 
6 All respondents in British Columbia are assigned to the Peace Region, while soil maps are used 
to assign all other landowners to one of the remaining four regions in Table 1. An alternative 
means of calculating foregone returns to agriculture is described in Suchánek (2001), but it only 
distinguishes between the three marginal land uses, thus providing little variation. Nonetheless, 
estimation results turn out to be similar regardless of which opportunity costs are used. 
  10planting trees on marginal land, where the latter might include benefits from having an assured 
and invariant annual payment (reduced risk), reduced frustration from harvesting hay in difficult-
to-get at areas, aesthetic benefits from forest landscapes, and so forth. To test the effect of these 
benefits on the decision to accept a tree-planting program, the choice to accept or reject the 
offered bid is regressed on both the bid and the opportunity cost of land.  
In addition, a number of control variables were employed as regressors. Two provincial 
indicators are used to account for differences in jurisdictional factors across provinces (with 
policy in northeastern B.C. generally following that in Alberta). Soil zone dummy variables are 
used to take into account weather, terrain, soil fertility and other productivity differences. One 
would expect farmers in the black soil zone to require greater compensation than those in the 
dark brown and brown soil zones. The reason is that the black soil zone demarcates the transition 
between the boreal forest and grain belt. While there is a greater capacity to grow trees in this 
zone, landowners have spent significant effort clearing trees and would likely be the most 
hesitant to replant (van Kooten et al. 2002). The brown soil zone is characterized by drier 
conditions, so drought tolerant species will need to be planted; farmers are more likely to view 
trees more positively for their soil conservation benefits (reducing wind erosion). 
A visual scale variable is used to incorporate farmer opinions about the aesthetic benefits 
of tree cover, which is likely to influence acceptance positively. The value of the visual variable 
ranges on an integer scale from 1, if the respondent considers increased tree cover in the region 
to enhance the visual appeal of the landscape, to 5 if she considers additional trees to be visually 
unappealing.  
As the number of acres of farmland covered by trees increases, we postulate that the 
likelihood of accepting the bid amount will increase for several reasons. Extant tree cover could 
  11indicate some preference for forest, but it could also indicate that soils in the region are better 
suited to forest than agriculture, although we control for the latter by including soil zone dummy 
variables. Owners of existing forests may also be more likely to accept a particular bid because 
an increase forest area leads to economies of scale in timber production. However, landowners 
with higher proportions of land in forest may have a lower marginal utility from non-market 
forest amenities, which would serve to reduce their likelihood of accepting a bid amount. 
Likewise, whether or not a respondent had previous experience with a tree-planting 
contract is thought to have a positive effect on the probability of accepting the bid to plant trees.  
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they would adapt to climate change by 
leaving agriculture altogether. We postulate that those who expressed a greater likelihood to 
leave agriculture as a response to climate change would be more likely to accept the bid amount. 
These are probably farmers who are already struggling to stay in the sector, perhaps because they 
are not the ‘best’ farmers, or they had a few bad years that they attribute to weather conditions. 
Such farmers may see forestry as a means to leave the sector without losing their land, or they 
may be interested in greater income stability, which a tree-planting contract could offer. 
Further, a farmer’s age would likely influence participation positively, as contracts 
reduce workloads while ensuring a steady income. Increased education, on the other hand, could 
influence the likelihood of accepting the bid amount negatively, because those with a higher 
education are more likely to view tree plantations as a restriction on future land-use flexibility. 
More educated landowners are likely more knowledgeable about the disputes concerning the 
Canadian Wheat Board marketing system and opportunities afforded should it be abandoned in 
the future. They may also be more knowledgeable about the WTO process and the impact future 
trade agreements will have on future grain markets and prices.  
  12Rather than planting trees, a farmer who expects to bequeath the farm to an heir may be 
better off to maximize annual returns and invest the proceeds in the capital market. However, 
agricultural landowners tend to invest in land, with which they are familiar. This increases farm 
size and results in increasing returns to scale, but also exposes the landowner to greater risks, 
some of which can be diversified by planting more trees and creating carbon offset credits. 
Further, the form in which land is passed on to an heir may be important: A diversified farm with 
forests that provide ecosystem amenities that benefit agricultural production is a form of 
investment that provides an heir with greater opportunities in the future. If this is the case and 
standing timber is considered a form of financial and non-financial wealth, those who expect to 
bequeath the farm are more likely to participate in tree planting. Contrariwise, tree-planting 
contracts reduce the long-term flexibility of land use and this might be considered to reduce the 
future options available to an heir. Which of these effects has the greatest influence on the 
probability of accepting a contract offer to plant trees can only be determined empirically.  
Finally, we employ a measure of net worth to capture a farmer’s wealth and size and 
scale of farm operations. Net worth is measured as a categorical variable, with ten categories 
starting with $100,000 and less, and increasing by $100,000 to a maximum of $1million. Again, 
it is not clear what effect wealth will have on the likelihood of accepting a bid to plant trees. As 
in the previous paragraph, larger and wealthier farmers may be exposed to more risk and, to 
reduce such risk, they are willing to move some land into forestry. Forests may also be seen as an 
investment that enhances the sustainability of agriculture and long-term yields. On the other 
hand, wealthier farmers may be better positioned to take advantage of changes in grain 
marketing institutions (e.g., trucking grain into the U.S. if the Canadian grain marketing system 
changes), seeing tree-planting contracts as reducing flexibility to pursue such opportunities. 
  13Summary statistics for the explanatory variables are provided in the last column of Table 
2. Not all returned surveys were used in the probit estimation. The design of the survey did not 
permit those respondents unwilling to accept any compensation to answer the contingent 
valuation questions. While these responses could be construed as a ‘no’ response for any bid 
amount, they were not included in this analysis as we are primarily interested in those willing to 
convert their land. Further research explores these responses as part of the relevant sample. As a 
result of this and some missing data, 103 observations were used to estimate WTA.  
5. RESULTS 
A general and a restricted regression model were estimated and the results provided in 
Table 2. The general model includes all of the explanatory variables available from the survey 
instrument and potentially able to explain the willingness of respondents to accept the offered 
bid. The restricted model is derived in iterative fashion by eliminating the least significant 
variable in each stage, continuing until the likelihood ratio χ
2 statistic falls below a critical 
significance level (see Table 2), in which case the restricted model is preferred to the general 
one. This is confirmed by McFadden’s (1974) Adjusted R
2 goodness of fit measure, which is also 














where LΩ is the log-likelihood in the null case (where all coefficients other than the constant are 
assumed to be zero), Lw is the unrestricted log-likelihood, and K equals to the number of 
parameters in the model.  
Surprisingly, the opportunity cost variable, whose construct was described in the 
preceding section, has no statistical impact on the probability of accepting the hypothetical tree-
  14planting program. Perhaps the range of opportunity costs in Table 1 was insufficient, but more 
likely the respondents did not consider the potential loss of direct income from their marginal 
fields to be an important consideration in choosing to plant trees on those fields. Rather, it might 
be the contribution of marginal fields to the total enterprise (the indirect income effect, perhaps 
operating through Canada’s grain quota system) that was important to those who chose not to 
take up the offered bid, or lack of contribution for those who did.  
The marginal effects of the explanatory variables are also provided in Table 2. For a 
continuous variable x, the marginal effect is calculated using Greene 2000 (p.815, Eq. 19-9), 
with the slope evaluated at the sample mean  x . The marginal effect for a dummy variable (dum) 
is calculated using: 
(5)  ] 0 , | 1 Pr[ ] 1 , | 1 Pr[
] | [
= = − = = =
∂
∂




where the matrix  X  represents all the other variables in the probit model evaluated at their 
sample means.  
Except for the intercept term, four coefficient estimates are significant at the 1% 
significance level and one at the 10% level of significance (Table 2). As expected, per acre 
compensation has a significant positive effect on the probability that a respondent accepts the bid 
amount. A one-dollar increase in the difference between the offered bid and forgone agricultural 
returns implies an increase of between one and nearly two percent in the probability of accepting 
the bid.  
The variable that has the greatest positive impact on the probability of accepting a tree-
planting program is whether land is located in the brown as opposed to the black soil zone 
(which is the reference case in the regression, along with Saskatchewan). Trees occur naturally 
  15and are common in the black (most northerly) and dark brown soil zones, but are less common in 
the (most southerly) brown soil zone. It is not surprising, therefore, that landowners in the brown 
soil zone, who have spent less time removing trees, are more likely to accept the bid amount. As 
shown by van Kooten et al. (2002), farmers in the black soil zone even appear negative towards 
tree planting because trees are seen as an obstacle to farm operations, while in the drier brown 
soil zone they act as shelterbelts and watersheds. It may be the ecosystem functions that cause 
landowners in the brown soil zone to be more receptive to planting of trees on marginal lands. 
The probability that landowners in the brown soil zone accept a bid to plant trees is some 50% 
higher at the margin.  
The more trees a farmer already has as a proportion of all owned land, the more likely she 
is to accept the opportunity to plant more trees, providing support for the notion that respondents 
have some preference for forest. While it might also indicate that the farmer is already producing 
timber and more forest area leads to economies of scale in timber production, this is unlikely the 
situation given that so few landowners practice commercial forestry in the region (although this 
has been changing rapidly in the past several years). However, the effect of an additional acre of 
tree cover produces only a small (less than 0.5 percent) increase in the likelihood that the 
respondent accepts the bid to plant more area to trees.  
Finally, the coefficient on age is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. 
Older agricultural producers are more likely to accept a tree-planting program that provides more 
secure and consistent annual payments, as hypothesized. An increase in age category increases 
the probability of accepting the offered compensation by about 1½ percent.  
The proxy income variable, net worth, is negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level. This result suggests that wealthier farmers see tree-planting contracts as reducing their 
  16flexibility to pursue future revenue opportunities as opposed to a means to reduce risk or 
improve the sustainability of agricultural production. At the margin, a farmer with $1 million 
additional wealth is 33% less likely to accept the offered bid. 
The visual variable is negative and, although statistically insignificant, an important 
factor explaining the likelihood a respondent would accept the offered compensation (as it could 
not be removed from the restricted model). This implies that, for a farmer who perceives further 
increases in local tree cover as visually unappealing, the probability of accepting a bid to plant 
trees is lower than for a farmer who is fond of trees. The marginal effect on the probability to 
accept for a one-step increase on the scale of the visual variable is approximately ten percent. So 
the difference in probabilities of accepting a bid to plant trees between a farmer who very much 
enjoys the visual aesthetics of trees and one who prefers a more open landscape can be as high as 
20%.  
Provincial dummy variables turned out to be statistically insignificant, possibly because 
soil zone captures some of this impact, but also because agricultural programs tend to be similar 
across the Canadian Prairies, despite the different political jurisdictions and separate agricultural 
ministries. Whether the landowner will pass the farm to an heir does not appear to be a 
significant variable, suggesting that continuation of the family farm is unimportant in explaining 
the decision to accept a tree-planting program – the benefit of passing along added wealth in the 
form of standing timber may be offset by the loss of flexibility in the way offspring can use land. 
Further, neither previous experience with a tree-planting program nor education affects the 
likelihood of accepting the proposed bid.  
By setting Pr(a=1)=0.5 and solving, it is possible to calculate the expected median 
compensation level for each respondent in the sample. We calculate median WTA for each 
  17respondent and provide the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values in Table 3. 
The average compensation required to get farmers to plant blocks of trees is $33.42 per acre, or 
$33.59/ac if estimated parameter values are random and Monte Carlo simulation is used. The 
estimated maximum compensation required, on the other hand, could be as high as 
approximately $75 per acre (or higher). It is important to keep in mind, however, that this 
pertains to the least productive acres and that compensation to plant large blocks of trees might 
well be much higher as increasingly better agricultural land is converted to tree cover. However, 
WTA compensation is often below the foregone earnings of the land, which most economists 
would use as the appropriate measure for estimating costs of carbon uptake.  
6. COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF TREE PLANTING ON AGRICULTURAL LANDS 
Using data from Table 3, it is possible to determine whether it would be cost-effective to 
pay farmers in western Canada to plant trees to mitigate climate change. To do so, we employ a 
40-year time horizon using the growth functions illustrated in Figure 1.
7 The growth functions 
represent a fast-growing species (hybrid poplar) and a mix of native species (see van Kooten et 
al. 1999, 1995). Native species are generally more attractive from a visual and ecological 
perspective. Carbon in wood biomass amounts to 0.187 metric tons of carbon (tC) per m
3 for 
hybrid poplar and 0.203 tC/m
3 for the slower growing native species. In addition, a factor of 1.57 
is assumed to account for total above ground biomass, while soil carbon is assumed to increase at 
a rate of 0.96 tC per ha per year when marginal agricultural land is converted to forest (van 
Kooten et al. 1999).  
  18Unlike a reduction in CO2 emissions, which results in a permanent decrease in the rise of 
atmospheric CO2, carbon uptake in sinks is not permanent (land can easily be converted back to 
agriculture releasing stored carbon). To take into account the ephemeral nature of tree planting, 
the IPCC (2000) recommends using ton-years, with the conversion factor ranging from one 
permanent ton being equivalent to 50 to 150 ton-years of temporary storage. Many observers 
have condemned the ton-year concept on various grounds, and it has been rejected by most 
countries, primarily because it disadvantages carbon sinks relative to emissions avoidance 
(Dutschke 2002, p.395).  
A second method that has been proposed is the use of temporary carbon emission 
reduction credits, which under an EU proposal would last for a period of five years. A country 
claiming such credits during Kyoto’s first commitment period would be held responsible for 
them in ensuing commitment periods.  
A third proposal for dealing with the ephemeral nature of biological carbon sinks is due 
to Marland et al. (2001), and Sedjo and Marland (2003). They suggest that the temporary nature 
of carbon uptake in sinks can be addressed via a rental market for credits, where the rental rate 
(r) is simply the price of a permanent emission credit (P) multiplied by the discount rate (δ), 
which equals the established financial rate of interest adjusted for the risks inherent to carbon 
uptake (e.g., fire risk, slower than expected tree growth, etc.). Thus, r = P × δ, which is the well-
known bond formula. If emissions trade for $15 per t CO2, say, and the risk-adjusted discount 
rate is 10%, then the annual rental for a metric ton of CO2 in a terrestrial sink would be $1.50. 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 We recognize that, in the WTA question, tree-planting contracts were specified to run for 10 
years, not 40 years. Yet, we assume the longer time horizon, implicitly assuming contracts are 
renewed under the same conditions, in order to estimate the costs of creating carbon credits. 
Alternatively, it can be assumed that landowners incur the same cost as given by WTA for 
keeping the land in forest until harvest at 40 years. 
  19Like the ton-year concept, this approach may make terrestrial sink projects less attractive than 
they might be under some other political solution. 
Since we do not know the value at which CO2 emissions trade, we employ the ton-year 
concept, using a conservative conversion factor of 50 ton-years of temporary to one ton of 
permanent removal of atmospheric CO2. Costs of carbon uptake are calculated using estimated 
planting costs of $1,050 per hectare and costs half that amount (see Krcmar et al. 2001),
8 and 
annual payments to landowners (in lieu of opportunity costs) from Table 3. Costs are discounted 
at 4%, while physical carbon is discounted at rates of 0%, 2% and 4%.
9 Krcmar et al. (2003) 
estimate stumpage rates in Alberta (using Government of Alberta methodology) of $8.52 per 
cubic meter for coniferous wood used in lumber production and $0.50/m
3 for deciduous timber 
used for OSB. Since these are conservative as they are rates intended to capture the resource rent, 
we also assume higher net stumpage value (returns after harvest costs) of $20/m
3 and $30/m
3 for 
conifers (natives) and $10/m
3 and $20/m
3 for poplar (van Kooten et al. 1999).  
In Table 4, we provide estimates of the costs of carbon uptake in Canadian dollars per 
metric ton of CO2 for low, medium and high stumpage values, three different rates for discounting 
future CO2 removals from the atmosphere (above and below ground biomass are included in 
calculations of carbon uptake), two tree planting options, and alternative plantation establishment 
costs. In addition, we compare results where the landowner is paid according to willingness to 
accept compensation and an opportunity cost of land of $54.78 per acre, with the latter determined 
                                                 
8 Cost data are from a 1997 study by the Agricultural Utilization Research Institute, University of 
Minnesota, Crookston (http://www.hybridpoplar.org/EMCosts.htm, 3 August 2003), and are 
converted from acres and USD to Canadian dollars per hectare. 
9 Weighting of physical flows of a resource as to when they are available is well established in 
the natural resource economics literature (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1968). On the discounting of physical 
carbon, see van Kooten et al. (2004, pp.241-42) for a discussion. 
 
  20as a weighted average of land in pasture (40%), hay (40%) and grain (20%) further averaged over 
regions. The costs of carbon uptake by afforestation in western Canada range from net benefits from 
tree planting to a cost of nearly $70 per t CO2 for fast-growing hybrid species, to some $30.50–
$135.00 per t CO2 for slow-growing native species, and then only if compensation is based on 
landowners’ WTA. If landowners are compensated according to estimated foregone net returns to 
extant agricultural activities, costs rise to $34.33–$84.09 per t CO2 for hybrid species under a low 
(but perhaps most realistic) stumpage value scenario, to $5.71–$30.10 per t CO2 for the most 
optimistic stumpage value scenario.  
Emission reduction permits are expected to trade in the range of $15 to $30 per t CO2.
10 In 
that case, the results suggest that landowners in western Canada are unlikely to make a major 
contribution to Canada’s Kyoto targets even if marginal agricultural lands are planted to fast-
growing hybrid species. If stumpage prices for poplar are similar to those of conifers or higher, 
planting costs are not “too high”, and landowners are compensated according to their willingness to 
accept compensation as opposed to the opportunity cost of land, then some planting of hybrid poplar 
will be competitive with emissions reductions for mitigating climate change. Clearly, there is no 
room to plant native species as these will not be able to compete with emissions reduction strategies. 
Nonetheless, our cost estimates for native species are not outside the range of estimates of the costs 
of carbon uptake in forest sinks found in the literature (van Kooten et al. 2004). 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
While farmers are unwilling to plant blocks of trees on their land without financial 
incentives, these incentives may be less than the net returns to current agricultural activities on 
                                                 
10 The Government of Canada has capped what large final emitters will have to pay at $15 pet t 
CO2, while emission reductions were trading in Europe at just under $30/t CO2 in June 2005.  
  21marginal agricultural land (compare Tables 1 and 3). This is because some farmers may receive 
benefits from growing trees that do not show up in market transactions. These benefits relate to 
potential reductions in risk from assured annual payments, environmental spillover benefits from 
forests that may enhance sustainable agricultural production, aesthetic benefits, and so on. Thus, 
if governments or large final emitters seeking offset carbon credits through biological sinks wish to 
minimize outlays, they should consider compensating landowners according to their WTA instead 
of observed net returns to extant land use. This could save between one-third and two-thirds of the 
costs of implementing an afforestation program, or result in more carbon sequestered for the same 
cost, an important consideration when programs have a budget constraint. However, it will require 
identifying those landowners who would be willing to participate in tree-planting programs, which 
could be done through a bidding process.  
This research also demonstrates that, even when landowners have some preference for 
forestry, the cost of providing carbon offset credits by planting native species of trees on 
marginal agricultural land in western Canada is likely higher than socially desirable: estimates of 
the costs of creating carbon credits by planting trees are more than likely to exceed the price 
projected under CO2 emissions trading schemes. This is generally but not always true even if 
farmers’ WTA compensation is below foregone returns to agricultural activities, because they 
receive other benefits (environmental amenities, reduced risk, potential earnings from sale of 
timber) from planting trees.  
Finally, further research needs to examine other important factors that influence farmer 
decisions and, in turn, the amounts of land available for tree planting in Canada. Critical in this 
regard is the attitude of landowners and environmental groups to large-scale planting of fast-
growing hybrid species, an object of future contingent valuation research. Also critical are the 
  22mechanisms and institutions used to compensate landowners, such as whether farmers receive 
direct payments from government, a private corporation or an environmental NGO, whether they 
can sell emission offset in open markets and/or whether they form cooperatives to market carbon 
credits or tree plantations. 
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  25Table 1: Net Returns to Agricultural Activities on Marginal Agricultural Lands, by Region 
or Soil Zone ($ per acre)
a  
 Land  Use 
Soil Zone  Crop  Hay  Pasture 
Brown Soil Zone  20.54  43.46  37.39 
Dark Brown Soil Zone  32.63  68.96  52.81 
Black Soil Zone  45.36  83.12  86.00 
Peace Region  34.54  88.17  26.40 
Grey-Wooded Soil Zone  35.11  63.67  Not available 
a Opportunity costs are calculated based on the Data provided by Alberta Agriculture, Food and 
Rural Development. 
 
  26Table 2: Probit Estimation Results (103 observations)
a  






















Opportunity Cost  0.005 
(0.010) ––  ––  48.408
Alberta (=1; =0 otherwise)  -0.224 
(0.371) ––  ––  0.308
Manitoba (=1; =0 otherwise)  -0.149 
(0.529) ––  ––  0.126







Dark Brown soil zone(=1;=0 otherwise)  0.145 
(0.393) ––  ––  0.258
Forest landscape visually unappealing
  -0.235 
(0.167)
-0.266 
(0.163)  -0.101 2.151







Respondent would leave agriculture if climate 
change became a reality (=1; =0 otherwise) 
0.127 
(0.493) ––  ––  0.25
Respondent previously participated in a tree-
planting program (=1; =0 otherwise) 
-0.128 
(0.339) ––  ––  0.618
Number of years of post-secondary education  -0.088 
(0.101) ––  ––  1.436










Respondent expects a heir to continue farming (=1; 
=0 otherwise) 
-0.063 
(0.344) ––  ––  0.715
Net worth







# of observations  103 103   
Log likelihood   -43.993 -45.043   
Likelihood ratio χ
2(df) 2.10(8)   
McFadden Adjusted R
2 0.161 0.260   
a Numbers below coefficient estimates are the Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors. 
*** indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% level or better; 
** indicates significance at 5% level or better; 
* indicates 
significance at 10% level or better. 
b The net worth variable is in million dollars. 
 
 





Estimated parameter values fixed; 
WTA based on farmers’ covariates  $33.42 $18.49 –$23.84 $74.06
Estimated parameter values random; 
representative farmer covariates 
(Monte Carlo simulation: n= 10,000) 
$33.59 $2.25 $25.45 $41.42
a Estimated using the restricted model in Table 2. 
 
  28Table 4: Estimated Costs of Carbon Uptake from Tree-planting in Western Canada (C$ 
per t CO2)  
















b 0%  2%  4% 0% 2% 4% 0%  2% 4%
WTA = $33.50 per ha per year           
Planting cost of $1050 per ha           
Slow growth  58.59  90.64  134.96 50.18 77.63 115.58 42.85  66.30 98.71
Rapid growth  36.40  51.24  68.68 22.46 31.62 42.38 7.79  10.96 14.69
Planting cost of $525 per ha   
Slow growth  46.24  71.53  106.50 37.83 58.57 87.13 30.50  47.19 70.26
Rapid growth  26.16  36.82  49.35 12.22 17.19 23.05 ++  ++ ++
Opportunity cost = $54.78 per ha per year         
Planting cost of $1050 per ha           
Slow growth  78.28  121.11  180.30 69.87 108.10 160.94 62.54  96.76 144.07
Rapid growth  44.57  62.73  84.09 30.63 43.11 57.79 15.96  22.46 30.10
Planting cost of $525 per ha   
Slow growth  65.93  102.00  151.86 57.52 88.99 132.49 50.19  77.65 115.61
Rapid growth  34.33  48.31  64.76 20.38 28.69 38.46 5.71  8.04 10.77
a For hybrid-poplar, trees are harvested after 20 years and again after 40 years, with the ton-years 
of carbon adjusted accordingly. ++ indicates benefits of tree planting so there are no carbon 
uptake costs. 
b Discounting is combined with the ton-years conversion factor as follows: If 1 tC is stored 
during the first year of growth, it is assumed to remain stored for 40 years (for natives) and is 
thus counted as 40 ton-years C. In the second year, storing 1 tC is counted as 39 ton-years C, but 
















Figure 1: Tree Growth Functions 
  30